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Abstract 
In contemporary debates on diversity, minorities are characterised mostly in terms of their 
cultural difference from the majority. Scholars have tended to focus on the role of minority 
representatives as advocates of their group interests in legislative assemblies. This article 
examines how minority representatives reach out to a mixed electorate, comprising voters of 
both minority and non-minority backgrounds, in election campaigns. Bringing together two 
hitherto distinct strands of the recent representative turn in political theory, theories of 
descriptive representation and constructivist theories of representation, for an inductive inquiry 
into minority representative claims in a majoritarian context, I argue the following. First, the 
influential contrast between the politics of presence and the politics of ideas underestimates the 
multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of minority identities, as well as the respects in which 
minority representation is conditioned and constrained by the politics of ideas associated with 
party competition. Second, while Saward's notion of shape-shifting representation is a 
promising for illuminating the multiple positionalities of minority representatives and the 
dynamic character of descriptive representation, its current formulation does not offer adequate 
criteria for operationalizing shape-shifting and evaluating its democratic character. Third, 
ethnographic approaches have an important role to play in countering the tendency in 
normative debates for the reification of minority identities, and the idealization of the 
democratic role of political parties. These arguments are established through a comparative 
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case study of the representative claims of BJP MPs of Dalit (Scheduled Caste) and Muslim 
backgrounds during the 2014 Indian national election campaign. 
 
Introduction 
While the recent representative turn in political theory has substantially advanced our 
understanding of the work involved in representation (eg. Urbinati 2006; Saward 2010, 2014), 
there is a growing gap between normative theories of representation, which offer ever more 
elaborate accounts of what democratic representation ideally requires, and empirical theories 
that focus on how politicians actually seek votes in existing democracies. Stepping into the 
breach, this article engages critically with two normative approaches to political representation: 
group representation or the politics of presence (Phillips 1995, Mansbridge 1999, Williams 
1998) and constructivist theories of political representation (Laclau 2005; Urbinati 2006; 
Saward 2010). While theorists of group representation have focussed on how descriptive 
representation can advance substantive representation and social justice, they have tended to 
assume that what descriptive representatives describe are concerns that derive primarily from 
their ascriptive identities. And whereas constructivist theories have emphasized that identities 
are not socially given but constituted through processes of political representation, these have 
tended to assume a universal political subject, with little attention to how a minority position 
affects the work of representation. The question of what descriptive representatives describe 
thus remains under-analysed in contemporary theories of representation. Both advocates of 
group representation and constructivist theorists have, for different reasons, neglected election 
campaigns as a site for the articulation of identity-based interests.  
 Focussing on Michael Saward’s influential concept of shape-shifting representation 
(2014), I argue that this potentially offers a way out of problems of essentialism and identity 
ascription that beset theories of minority representation, but has remained limited in scope. 
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Proposing an inductive inquiry to test theories of representation, I focus on claim-making by 
minority representatives in India during the 2014 election campaign that led to majoritarian 
nationalist consolidation under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This article asks: how did 
minority representatives seek to establish representativeness with a mixed electorate during the 
election campaign? To establish their representative credentials, which identities and interests 
did minority MPs select and project onto their constituents during campaigning? How did these 
change depending on audiences? How did representative claims differ across representatives 
of different minority backgrounds, Muslim and Dalit? And finally, how did voters respond to 
the claims of representatives during electioneering? While a study of voting behaviour is 
outside the scope of this inquiry, election campaigns offer a brief window into the reception of 
representative claims by voters, a dimension relatively neglected by theorists of representation. 
In this article, I advance three related claims. First, I argue that dominant 
characterisations of minority claims in terms of cultural difference underestimate the multi-
dimensional and dynamic nature of minority identities. Minority representative claims in 
Indian electoral campaigns drew upon the repertoires of a range of identities shared in common 
with the majority, such as those of region and party. In some cases, these included majoritarian 
religious identities. Second, while advancing our understanding of representation in several 
respects, Saward’s (2014) notion of shape-shifting in its current form does not offer sufficient 
resources for evaluating its extent, or democratic character. In our study, minority 
representative claims shifted not just across a range of subject- positions, but were also 
simultaneously, shape-shifting and shape-accordant or confined, depending upon the 
dimension of identity in question (eg religious, caste, party), and the standpoint of evaluation 
(eg. representative or constituency). The significance of multiple perspectives of evaluation for 
shape-shifting remains neglected in Saward’s account. Third, in terms of methodology, I show 
that ethnographic approaches have an important role to play in countering the tendency in 
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normative theories of representation to reify ethnic identities and idealize the role 
representative institutions. In particular, whereas normative theorists have tended to idealize 
the democratic role of political parties and mechanisms of representation more generally (eg 
White and Ypi 201, Urbinati 2006: 4-6), my findings suggest that their role in limiting 
deliberation and the autonomy of representatives needs greater attention.  
 My discussion is organised into five sections. The first section argues for collaboration 
between two distinct strands of the representative turn in political theory that have hitherto 
tended to speak past each other, theories of descriptive representation and of representative 
claims. The second section provides a brief background on the Indian general election 
campaigns of 2014, the candidates, constituencies, and methods deployed in the study. The 
third and fourth sections offer a comparative analysis of the representative claims of BJP MPs 
of Dalit and Muslim backgrounds, to mixed audiences, and minority voters respectively. The 
concluding section discusses some general implications of the comparative case-study for 
wider debates on minorities, shape-shifting representation, and the role of ethnography in 
advancing democratic theory.   
 
Descriptive representation and representative claims: Two theoretical approaches 
How do minority representatives seek to establish representativeness with a mixed electorate, 
comprising voters from both minority and non-minority backgrounds in contexts of 
majoritarian nationalism? How do they negotiate the gap between representatives and those 
that they represent that is inherent in the very concept of representation (Pitkin 1972: 8-9)? 
This question, surprisingly neglected in the empirical scholarship on representation, implicates 
minority representation on the one hand, and the work of representation on the other. Both have 
come to be extensively reappraised by contemporary theorists of representation in ways that 
go beyond Pitkin’s classic study.  
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 In Pitkin’s influential account, identity representation is discussed as part of descriptive 
representation, which  
depends on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is, or is like, on being 
something rather than doing something. The representative does not act for 
others; he “stands for” them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection 
between them, a resemblance or reflection…(1972:60, emphasis added).  
 
Pitkin holds that ‘the descriptive view has no room…for leadership, initiative, or creative 
action. The representative is not to give new opinions to his constituents, but to reflect those 
they already have’ (1972:89, 90). While Pitkin does recognize the relational and contextual 
nature of identities in representation, noting for instance that not all characteristics can be 
described, ‘so it is always a question of which characteristics are politically relevant for 
reproduction’ which varies with ‘time and place’ (1972: 87), she did not theorize this further 
(Disch 2015). 
 Pitkin’s account of descriptive representation has come to be challenged from two 
distinct standpoints in recent debates. First, whereas Pitkin had been dismissive of descriptive 
representation, theorists of minority representation have argued how in certain contexts, 
descriptive representation can advance the substantive representation of the interests of 
historically disadvantaged groups (Phillips 1995: 25, Mansbridge 1999:635-36), or otherwise 
advance values of democratic justice, even when substantive representation does not occur 
(Phillips 1995: 39, 40).  A second direction of challenge has come from constructivist 
scholarship on representation, which has criticised Pitkin’s assumption that the represented 
have ‘a clear…. stable set of interests’ that representatives simply mirror or reflect (Saward 
2010: 10). Following on the work of social theorists (eg. Bourdieu 1991), political theorists 
such as Ernesto Laclau, Nadia Urbinati and Michael Saward among others have highlighted 
that the identities and interests to be represented are not socially given or pre-political but rather 
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constituted through processes of representation (Laclau 2005: 158; Urbinati 2006: 24; Saward 
2010: 14). As Laclau puts it, the ‘represented depends on the representative for the constitution 
of his or her own identity’ (2005: 158).  
Whereas these two theoretical approaches to representation have tended to proceed 
separately, I argue that bringing these together can enhance the efficacy of each. A focus on 
the political constitution of identities can help to mitigate some enduring challenges that 
confront advocates of minority representation, notably those of essentialism and external 
ascription. Identity representation is haunted by the charge of essentialism, the claim that a 
descriptive group shares common interests based on ‘a single or essential trait’ that can 
‘transcend the interests that divide them’ (Mansbridge 1999: 637). Theorists of group 
representation have sought to counter essentialism in several ways, recognizing the challenge 
posed by intra-group diversity for instance (Phillips 1995, Williams 1998). Minority 
representatives represent their group’s interests not by virtue of how they look or shared 
phenotypical characteristics, but rather shared social experiences of exclusion (Mansbridge 
1999:629).  Nonetheless, an advocacy of increased presence of members of marginalized 
groups raises issues of which perspectives define the group and how group interests come to 
be constituted, questions which have received only cursory attention in theories of minority 
representation. A related problem is that of identity ascription, the imposition of identities from 
the outside, which obscures the agency of individuals in defining their group membership and 
perpetuates misrecognition through the reinforcement of dominant stereotypes. Again, 
theorists of group representation do recognize ‘the agency of individuals to define the meaning 
of their social and biological traits’ (Williams 1998:6). Nevertheless, with relatively little 
attention devoted to how group identities are inhabited by their members, normative theorists 
have inadvertently tended to reinforce socially given identity frames (see also Urbinati 2006: 
49). 
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The constructivist turn in representation, although rarely focussing on minorities, has 
highlighted the role of representation and the agency of representatives in the constitution of 
political identities. Michael Saward’s influential notion of the representative claim exemplifies 
how constructivist approaches bring into relief the often invisible work of representation. Like 
Laclau (2005:161), Saward rejects Pitkin’s contrast between symbolic and substantive 
representation, arguing instead that ‘the active making of symbols or images of what it is to be 
represented’ is vital to a ‘substantive acting for’ (Saward 2010: 15-16).  Furthermore, whereas 
for Pitkin, ‘the maker of representations…is present, but is not seen as significant’, Saward 
seeks to liberate ‘the politician as artist, as a maker of representations...’ (2010: 13, 16). Instead 
of emphasizing certain representative roles or styles as theorists have tended to do (eg 
principal- agent, delegate- trustee in Pitkin 1972), Saward argues that representatives should 
be seen fundamentally as shape-shifters, engaged in ‘innovative blurring and hybridizing of 
roles in and through practice’ (Saward 2014: 725). Involving ‘repositioning the persona and 
the nature of…claims to audiences or constituencies’ (2014: 730), shape-shifting for Saward is 
not a negative trait, a moral weakness as popular dismissals of politicians double-speak 
suggest, but a creative practice that is central to the work of representation. While Saward’s 
emphasis on movement across multiple positionalities marks an important advance over the 
traditional focus on representative roles, he does not consider how representatives position 
themselves in relation to multiple socio-political identities.  
Nevertheless, I contend that Saward’s notion of shape-shifting representatives 
potentially offers a way out of the problems of essentialism and identity ascription that confront 
theories of minority representation. Its emphasis on the situational and relational character of 
representation can illuminate the dynamics of descriptive representation, challenging common 
depictions of minority identities as singular and fixed. Furthermore, Saward’s focus on the 
agency of representatives can illuminate how minority representatives choose to define their 
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social identities, highlighting insider perspectives over external attributions of identity. Saward 
himself portrays descriptive likeness as akin to a single subject-position (2014: 727). However, 
his critique of the category of role that theorists of representation have focussed on, as 
obscuring ‘agent choice and capacity’ (2014: 729), opens up for examination the multiple roles 
that minority representatives inhabit. Finally, importantly for an inquiry into minority 
representation, Saward’s typology of shape- accordant and shape-confined forms recognizes 
that there may be inequalities in the structural positions of representatives, that a representative 
could inhabit a role from a position of weakness, or of strength.   
I suggest, furthermore, that for constructivist theories of representation, a minority 
position offers an important vantage point for re-evaluating the work of representation in 
general that has been their primary focus. Prima facie, candidates of minority background 
would be expected to encounter obstacles with regard to identification with the majority 
population, and thereby need to undertake additional work to establish representativeness 
relative to candidates from majority communities. The work of minority representation has 
been explicated primarily in terms of the representation of minority perspectives and identities. 
Anne Phillips, Jane Mansbridge, Melissa Williams among others have elaborated the ways in 
which minority representation can advance the substantive and symbolic representation of 
minorities and why it matters from democratic standpoints (eg Phillips 1995: 25, 39, 40; 
Mansbridge 1999: 642-644). However, the role of minority representatives in navigating 
between majority and minority interests, and across different identity dimensions, remains 
underexplored. This can potentially advance our understanding of shape-shifting, as well as the 
role of negotiation, mediation and translation in the work of representation. Emerging studies 
of representative claims have begun to recognize the significance of minority representatives 
as a link between majority and minority groups (eg. Severs and de Jong 2018), in ways that 
parallel the role of the colonial cultural broker, for instance. While the concept of brokerage is 
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potentially promising for understanding minority representation, how it works in contexts of 
representative democracy, where minority representatives seek popular validation from 
multiple constituencies, remains to be elaborated.  
 
Representative practices and election campaigns: A note on method 
So far, I have argued that bringing together two distinct strands of the representative turn is 
mutually beneficial, enabling a better understanding of the dynamics of descriptive 
representation as well as the constructive work of representation. I now want to take the 
argument further, and suggest that an inductive inquiry into representative practices notably 
election campaigns can yield important insights for theories of representation. While critical of 
the normative orientation of Pitkin and other theorists for ruling out ‘much what is accepted as 
counting for representation’ (2010: 9), Saward himself offers little sustained engagement with 
representative practices, beyond a few instances of exemplary individuals. The democratic 
legitimacy of representative claims, he contends, depends on their acceptance by the relevant 
constituency. Yet, the notion of the constituency and its acceptance of representative claims 
remain under-specified in his account, with constituencies appearing largely as unified, 
univocal entities in the legitimation of claims. As any sustained engagement with 
representative practices demonstrates, however, constituencies are multi-layered, and multi-
vocal in their responses to claims. The complexity of evaluating legitimation increases in the 
case of minority representatives who are frequently called upon to represent the interests of 
groups who did not elect them (eg. women, Blacks, Muslims), as well as geographical districts 
that elected them.  
 An inductive approach focussing on collective practices of representation can also help 
tackle the problem of essentialism faced by theories of minority representation. As scholarship 
on gender has shown, an examination of the collective practices of social movements and 
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policy debates (Celis et al 2014) can help to highlight multiple perspectives among women, 
challenging the implausible views of women as a homogeneous group. In the case of 
minorities, however, the focus has often tended to be on exceptional individuals (eg Obama), 
leaving intact dominant understandings of minority groups.  
In contrast to contemporary theories of representation, I contend that election 
campaigns are potentially an important site for the evaluation of representative claims. 
Constructivist theorists such as Saward have sought to move away from elections and formal 
representative institutions, towards non-elected forms of representation such as the media, 
NGOs, social activists. Theorists of group representation have also tended to focus on the 
composition of legislative assemblies and the role of the representative as a legislator, with 
little attention to how representatives get into legislatures in the first place. In both cases, the 
focus has been on representatives speaking for, or on behalf of a group, with relatively little 
attention to how representatives speak to their constituents (for the latter, see the classic Fenno 
1978). Election campaigns allow us to examine how representatives describe their identities to 
their constituents, and to observe, in an abbreviated form, the reactions of different sections of 
constituents to representative claims, dimensions that remain neglected in Saward’s account. 
A national election campaign offers a much larger stage than legislative debate for the public 
scrutiny of representative claims, open in theory at least to all citizens, in which these are 
evaluated by different audiences from a range of standpoints.   
 A further reason that theorists of representation have tended to move away from 
elections and other formal representative institutions is the recent experience of Western 
democracies of low voter turnouts and widespread apathy. However, in electoral democracies 
in Asia and Africa, notably India, elections remain popular, despite widespread distrust of 
politicians. Representation is of course a systemic process that is not limited to formal elected 
institutions; furthermore, elective processes may limit the ‘style and scope of representation 
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that emanates from them’ (Saward 2010: 24). However, it is also the case that like other 
political institutions, elections embody values of formal equality in ways that the institutions 
of the market and the civil society that are structured by deep inequalities, do not offer. As 
such, I argue that elections are an important discursive site for an evaluation of representative 
claims.  
In terms of method, given the paucity of existing research on the question, a case study 
approach was chosen (Gerring 2004) based on field-research, shadowing the election 
campaigns of two sitting members of Parliament (MPs) of minority backgrounds from the BJP. 
Candidates from different minority backgrounds were selected, Dalit and Muslim, 
marginalized by virtue of their caste and religion respectively in contemporary India. As 
Muslims and Dalits are dispersed minorities, and separate communal electorates were 
abolished at constitution-making (see Bajpai 2011 for details), Muslim and Dalit 
representatives are elected by a majority of non-Muslim and non-Dalit voters, which was the 
case in our sample as well. It might be argued that while ostensibly descriptive representatives, 
our cases are not technically so in the strict sense of the term, as minority representatives in 
India are not elected by voters of their community alone. However, as studies in several 
contexts have shown, representatives of minority background face ‘implicit and explicit 
expectations’ from their political party, media organisations, and the general public to speak as 
group representatives (Celis and Wauters 2010: 388), and often perform that role, irrespective 
of the electoral mechanism linking them to their social group.  
As is common with ethnographic studies, the sample was small, and the selection of 
cases was not intended as representative, or comprehensive, but rather as illustrative and 
exploratory. Ethnographic approaches have several well-known limitations, including what 
Herzog and Zacka (2017) term ‘perspectival absorption, bias and particularism’. To mitigate 
the problems of identification with respondents and resultant bias, multiple voices and 
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positions in the field were accessed. Field-work included semi-structured interviews not just 
with the MPs and their chief aides, but also the main opponent candidates from other parties, 
as well as different sub-groups of voters during election meetings and voting.1 Approximately 
50% of the sample of voters interviewed were of minority backgrounds, with the remainder 
drawn from diverse socio-economic strata. In addition, multi-sited participant observation was 
undertaken, including attending and observing election rallies and walk-abouts, recording the 
speeches of the main candidates in different neighbourhoods. Finally, I followed the 
interactions of representatives with different audiences and voters in a range of settings. A 
research design of multiple interviews and observations across a range of sites and very 
different cases allowed for a measure of abstraction and generalization.  This study forms part 
of a larger research project involving approximately 70 Indian MPs conducted between 2013-
16 focussing on the work of representation through the prism of minority representation in a 
majoritarian polity. 
 
Election campaigns 2014: Context and cases 
The 2014 Indian elections unexpectedly handed a comfortable majority to the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (51% seat share in the Lower House, based on 31% of the popular 
vote). The BJP’s campaign was populist and personality-centred, starring Narendra Modi as 
the icon of a youthful population’s aspirations to jobs and upward mobility (Jaffrelot 2015). 
Through a centralized, expensive, and technologically innovative election campaign using 
social media platforms such as holograms, Whatsapp, Twitter, and Facebook, Modi was 
projected as the strong-man who would tackle India’s myriad problems of development 
(vikaspurush) and bring roads, electricity and water to all.  
But how did Modi as an icon of development translate on the ground, in the campaigns 
of BJP candidates from minority backgrounds? The candidates, constituencies, and nature of 
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the contest were very different in the two cases, although both candidates belonged to the same 
party, and to communities that were similar in numerical proportions (Dalits and Muslims were 
each estimated to be just less than a third of the voting population of the respective 
constituencies). Dr Kirit Solanki was standing for re-election from Ahmedabad (West), a 
constituency reserved for Scheduled Castes in the western Indian state of Gujarat, where he 
had won in 2009.2 Dr Solanki was a highly educated and well-to-do surgeon with a successful 
private practice. He did not have a large following of his own and was not a well-known 
political figure in national or regional politics. Shahnawaz Husain, by contrast, the BJP’s only 
elected Muslim MP, was a nationally recognized party spokesman who appeared regularly on 
television news programmes. He was seeking re-election from Bhagalpur in Bihar in northern 
(east) India, a constituency that he had represented in Indian parliament since 2006. First 
elected to the Lok Sabha in 1999, he had held several ministerial posts in the BJP-led 
government between 1999-2004.  
The two constituencies were very different in terms of their pattern of party 
competition, intensity of the campaign, and electoral outcomes. Ahmedabad (West) is a 
recently demarcated constituency in Gujarat, reserved since 2009 for Scheduled Caste 
candidates. By contrast, Bhagalpur, one of the oldest districts in the north-eastern state of Bihar 
is a general seat. In Ahmedabad, the contest was primarily two-way, between the BJP and the 
Congress, whereas Bhagalpur saw a four-way contest between the BJP and regional parties. 
Bhagalpur was a marginal constituency for the BJP, whereas Ahmedabad was a safe seat. 
Consequently, Bhagalpur saw several high-octane election rallies with several BJP leaders in 
attendance, including Modi himself. By contrast, the campaign in Ahmedabad was more low-
key (thandi), bringing in no high-profile national leaders of note. In terms of electoral 
outcomes, in Ahmedabad, Dr Kirit Solanki won by a margin of over 320000, doubling his 
margin of victory from the previous election. In Bhagalpur, Shahnawaz Hussain lost, 
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unexpectedly and narrowly by a margin of less than 10,000 votes. In Ahmedabad, the turnout 
was 62.64; in Bhagalpur, it was 57.88%.  
 
Presence through Ideas:  Minority representative claims and the limits of inclusion 
In scholarly and popular debates, minority representatives tend to be viewed primarily through 
the lens of their ethnic identities, with a minority position usually defined in terms of cultural 
difference from the majority. However, the first feature of note in minority representative 
claims during the 2014 election campaign was that these emphasized similarity between 
majority and minority identities and interests. The cultural resources marshalled by the 
candidates were drawn less from their ethnic identities, than from the ideologies and 
programmes of their political party.   
A typical speech of the Ahmedabad (West) during his election walkabouts 
(jansamparak rounds) went as follows: 
Friends, I am the candidate of Bharatiya Janata Party and a soldier of Gujarat 
Chief Minister Narendrabhai Modi. If you press the lotus button in front of my 
name, I will get your blessings (aashirwad), win with a large majority, and the 
son of Gujarat, chief minister Narendra Modi will become India’s Prime 
Minister (author translation from Gujarati). 
Persuasion in representative claims centrally involves rhetoric, which serves to link together 
‘differently situated and differently disposed actors’ (Dryzek 2010: 325). As the speech 
suggests, in order to make himself known to voters, and to establish his credentials as a 
representative, the MP standing from a Dalit quota, identified in the first instance with the 
party, its symbol on the ballot paper (lotus), and with the Gujarat Chief Minister and icon of 
the 2014 campaign, Narendra Modi. The candidate’s relationship to Modi was portrayed as 
that of a disciplined party-worker and a loyal subordinate to his commander, rather than of 
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shared kinship or another form of personalistic relationship characteristic of patronage relations 
prominent in the scholarship on South Asia. The language made subtle allusions to party 
ideology - the term ‘soldier’ referred not just to the cadre-based character of the BJP, but also 
its close association with the RSS and its quasi-militaristic notion of Hindu nationalism 
(Jaffrelot 2011). In Gujarat, there was an appeal to regional cultural pride - by casting their 
vote in favour of the candidate, voters would be electing one of their own, a son of the soil, as 
India’s Prime Minister. In the different mixed-population neighbourhoods of the city that Dr 
Solanki visited with BJP workers as part of the official campaign, the speech remained largely 
the same. A range of representational possibilities beyond the individual candidate were offered 
in appeals to an electorate that it was implicitly acknowledged, might be unfamiliar with, and 
perhaps unlikely to vote for the candidate on his own.  
Silences shape rhetoric as well as speech, and what was not said was also significant. 
In public speeches to mixed audiences, there were no references to the candidate’s past record 
as an MP, either in terms of raising issues relating to his constituents in Parliament, or bringing 
public works to the area, although the MP had a record much above the average in both areas.  
Nor were there attempts to outline and debate any concrete policies by the candidate or party 
workers during their walkabouts – for instance, what development (vikas) for all, the BJP’s 
main campaign slogan in the 2014 election meant, was not elaborated. The campaign leaflets 
carried photos of Narendra Modi and the candidate and the price rise of daily commodities 
under the previous Congress administration. In the Ahmedabad campaign, representative 
claims tended to be plebiscitory rather than deliberative (Chambers 2009) in character. 
Representative claims involve not just what the candidates say, but also what the 
campaign looks and sounds like to audiences. In Gujarat, the visual and aural language of the 
Dalit MP’s election rallies closely resembled those of Hindu religious processions, and could 
merge easily with these in the public eye. The walkabouts were led by party workers on 
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scooters sporting saffron scarves and head-bands, heralded by drummers. The candidate 
usually wore Hindu religious markers, and made brief visits to temples in the neighbourhoods 
where he was campaigning, avoiding mosques and churches. Speeches in rallies across the city, 
often conducted in the backdrop of the Hindu nationalist figuration of the nation as a mother 
Goddess with images superimposed on maps of undivided India, commenced and concluded 
with slogans of ‘glory to Mother India’ (Bharat Mata ki Jai), with the audience exhorted to 
participate in the appeal to Hindu practices of goddess worship. By contrast, in the images and 
ceremonies of the campaign, there was nothing that could resonate with voters from Muslim, 
Christian and other non-Hindu backgrounds, a silencing which was echoed in the relative 
absence of any campaigning by the party in neighbourhoods where Muslims and Christians 
predominated. When the candidate’s convoy passed through streets where Muslims lived, its 
passage was tense and relatively subdued, with no speeches or cheering. As such, the ‘verbal 
and visual images’ (Saward 2010: 492) of the constituency that was described in the 
representative claims of a Dalit minority candidate denoted an assertive, undifferentiated Hindu 
community.  
In relation to his political party, the Ahmedabad MP’s recourse to the language and 
symbols of Hindu nationalism can be seen as an instance of what Saward (2014) terms a shape-
accordant pattern of representation, from a position of weakness. Within the context of a 
powerful leader-centered party aggressively propagating Hindu nationalism, representatives 
had few opportunities to shape-shift other than to position themselves as delegates of the party 
its leadership, and its primary constituency, the Hindu community. Seen from the perspective 
of his minority constituency, however, the MP was seeking to shape-shift, positioning his 
persona as a representative not so much of Dalits for whom reservations were instituted, as of 
the Hindu community as a whole.3  
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While an examination of voter responses is outside the scope of this paper, based on 
the limited evidence of the reactions observed during the election campaign, the candidate’s 
claims appeared to resonate with audiences. Asked what brought them to an election rally, 
some female senior citizens replied ‘we have come for Mother’ (Interviews, 25.4.14), 
indicating the resonance of the party’s symbol of India as mother goddess (Bharat Mata) with 
folk religious practices of Goddess worship. Most BJP party workers campaigning for the 
candidate in Ahmedabad interviewed said that while personally opposed to Dalit quotas, they 
were working to bring a good candidate, and above all else, their party and Modi to power in 
Delhi.  
While the discursive and symbolic register of Hindu nationalism enabled a Dalit 
representative reach out to his upper and middle caste Hindu constituents mostly opposed to 
the Dalit quota that he represented,4 for a Muslim candidate, the task was harder, given the 
ideology’s anti-Muslim thrust. How did the BJP’s sole Muslim MP seek to reach out to a mixed 
electorate? Shahnawaz Husain’s speeches in Bhagalpur spoke to the BJP’s 2014 slogan of 
development for all and in keeping with the party’s position, rejected secularism as special 
treatment of religious minorities. Emphasizing the material interests that Muslims voters had 
in common with non-Muslims, he stated in a television interview: ‘Their [Muslim] children 
also want jobs, they also want a share in the fruits of development, and equality’ (ABP news, 
13.4.14). His village pit stop speeches frequently invoked the value of non-discrimination on 
the basis of religious identity, denoting in his case, an absence of special attention to Muslim 
interests: ‘when I work I take everyone with me – whether they are Hindu or Muslim I have 
made no discrimination (bhed-bhav).’  
In positioning his Muslim constituency’s interests, and his own persona as a 
representative, as no different from that of non-minority voters in his territorial constituency, 
Shahnawaz’ claims appear shape confined in relation to the party in the terms of Saward’s 
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typology, complying with the BJP’s hostility to the expression of Muslim identity and interests. 
At the same time, in describing his Muslim constituency as similar to the majority in terms of 
its aspirations, Shahnawaz was also attempting to shape-shift within the constraints of his 
position, challenging dominant stereotypes of the Muslim community as distinct from the 
mainstream.  
As in Ahmedabad, the reactions of audiences in Bhagalpur to the representative’s 
claims confirm that it was the party, its leadership and ideology that were crucial in sustaining 
claims of representativeness of a minority candidate with non-minority audiences. At a 
television talk show, the presenter struggled to be heard amidst chants of ‘Modi, Modi’. She 
asked the audience what their MP had done to deserve the people’s vote again, and the response 
from a female constituent was typical: 
…if [we] want Modi in the Centre [screams from audience], then [we will] have 
to make Shahnawaz win…and give lotus flower [BJP symbol] as a gift to that 
centre … (Aaj Tak news, 9.4. 14). 
In many ways, the centrality of the party is only to be expected in a national election 
campaign in which the party programme and ideology predominate. Minority representatives 
contesting a territorial constituency on a party ticket primarily represent its programme and 
ideology as Phillips (1995) notes, even when they choose to speak for their ethnic group or 
gender. For minority representation, the overriding significance of the party however meant 
that inclusion was limited, on the one hand, offering minority presence without recognition of 
difference, and asymmetric on the other, with different opportunities for Dalit and Muslim 
representatives in the BJP. For a Dalit representative, it was possible to describe their cultural 
identity in the terms offered by Hindu nationalism, which allowed for a limited form of 
recognition to a historically denigrated group, as members of the Hindu community of equal 
standing to the higher castes. For a Muslim representative, however, inclusion was not possible 
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within the party’s Hindu nationalist ideology, instead was sought to be achieved through the 
party slogan of development for all, which offered a thinner form of identification. In both 
cases, the candidates’ minority group membership did not figure in their claims to mixed 
audiences. While the appeal to the party ideology and programme enabled minority 
representatives reach out to non-minority voters, and mitigated some identity-related status 
issues, it also limited the terms of minority inclusion. 
 
The multiple dimensions of presence and the limits of shape-shifting 
Against my argument so far, it could be contended that while the centrality of the party is likely 
to obtain when minority representatives seek to reach a mixed electorate, when speaking to 
voters from ethnic backgrounds similar to their own, a more direct relationship obtains, by 
virtue of a shared social identity. Jane Mansbridge has argued for instance that if 
representatives and voters belong to the same subordinate group, this can help to forge ‘bonds 
of trust’ with voters based ‘on the shared experience of subordination’, helping to overcome 
the inattention and distrust that act as ‘barriers to communication between dominant and 
subordinate groups’ (1999: 642).  
If, however, my finding regarding the mediating role of the party in the relationship 
between representatives and voters holds, minority representatives belonging to a majoritarian 
party would instead expect to encounter distrust from members of their communities, given 
that their party, the BJP, has historically had little support among Dalit and Muslim voters 
(Jaffrelot 2015). This was indeed observed in our cases, as BJP Dalit and Muslim 
representatives, anticipating suspicion from their Dalit and Muslim constituents, deployed a 
range of creative discursive strategies seeking to overcome the trust deficit. Two strategies can 
be discerned in representative claims. The first involved reframing the party’s relationship with 
minority voters, which involved countering the BJP’s negative image among minorities as well 
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as recasting minority perspectives to better align with their party. The second involved 
circumventing the party, emphasizing the MP’s minority group membership and the work 
undertaken in minority neighbourhoods.   
The problem of distrust was most evident in relation to Muslim voters, given the anti-
Muslim stance of the BJP and Modi. Shahnawaz Husain’s pit stop speeches in Muslim areas 
sought to challenge the BJP’s image as anti-Muslim, reminding Muslim voters that the party 
they distrusted, had re-nominated him, a minority candidate and given him an important 
position as party spokesman: ‘what I say is accepted as the party view that you hear on TV 
(12.4.14). Shahnawaz also emphasized his role as an advocate (vakil) of Muslims within the 
BJP, and the advocacy (vakalat) that he did for the group, positioning himself as a trustee of 
Muslim interests within the party. As Urbinati has argued, claims to advocate on behalf of a 
group go beyond descriptive representation, for it is ‘not people's identity as such that seeks 
for representation, but their ideas and claims as citizens who suffer, or are liable to suffer, 
injustice because of their identity (2000: 776). Establishing equivalence with other parties was 
another reframing strategy deployed to detoxify the party for Muslim voters, a familiar 
approach of candidates perceived as majoritarian. Shahnawaz Husain reminded voters of the 
many riots that took place under the rule of the Congress and other so-called secular rivals of 
the BJP; as such, the latter did not deserve to be distrusted more by Muslim voters.  
Reframing the relationship between the representative and constituents involved 
attempts to recast influential views not just of the party but also of their community identity. 
Shahnawaz Husain sought to challenge influential perceptions, including self-perceptions of 
Muslims as essentially religious, as voting according to their religious identity. Emphasizing 
secular over religious concerns, he cautioned his Muslim constituents against their religious 
leaders’ interference in politics: 
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…remember, the elections that happen are for roads, electricity, water, 
employment …this vote is a worldly thing…it is not a matter of religion…don’t 
go according to anyone’s decree or fatwa…(12.4.14, translated from Urdu) 
As this illustrates, even within a majoritarian, plebiscitary context of a national election 
campaign, representatives sometimes sought to transform existing preferences and prejudices 
instead of treating these as given, as we would expect (Chambers 2009: 339). 
If one shape-shifting strategy used by minority representatives to overcome the distrust 
of their party among minority constituents was reframing dominant perceptions of their party 
and their community, a second approach was that of circumvention, emphasizing a direct 
relationship between the representative and their community. At a village stop, Shahnawaz 
attacked his political opponents for making Muslims fear the BJP:  
… do not scare people of my community…this is a community that is God-
fearing, it is not fearful of political leaders and political parties 
[clapping]…(12.4.14)  
Rhetoric that was bonding in terms of religious characteristics (eg. Muslim symbols such as 
the Hajj) was deployed her to bridge (on the general distinction, see Dryzek 2010) the 
representative’s differences from his co-religionists that stemmed from his party and caste-
class identities (the representative belonged to an upper- caste Muslim community whereas 
audiences in this instance were predominantly lower caste, poor Muslims).  
A novel way of seeking to establish a direct relationship between the candidate and his 
constituents was by describing this in the terms conventionally used for marital and filial 
relationships: 
Today between you and me there is no one. We…have a direct 
relationship…You are maintaining the relationship (rishta nibha rahe hain) 
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[shouts of zindabad]…it was not easy for you to vote for a BJP man, the lotus– 
you did this difficult work… 
The metaphor of a love relationship allowed the representative to simultaneously, evoke a 
direct, unmediated connection with voters, side-stepping the party’s negative image among his 
Muslim constituents, to recognize that despite the fact that their relationship was sometimes 
difficult to maintain, his constituents had been fulfilling the duties of the relationship, under 
difficult circumstances, as many wives and husbands, parents and children do, and that they 
should continue to do so, in the form of voting for him in the election. The metaphor of a love 
relationship in this case evoked a bond between the representative and constituents that could 
encompass descriptive likeness but went beyond this, denoting attachment to a person desirable 
yet distinct from oneself.  
 Another discursive strategy commonly adopted by minority representatives to establish 
their credentials with their minority constituents involved reminders of the work that they had 
done for their community, usually the provision of collective goods in minority 
neighbourhoods such as roads, bridges, parks, libraries, senior citizen shelters. Again, such 
appeals suggest that minority representatives did not see descriptive likeness as sufficient for 
establishing trust with their minority constituents, given that their party, the BJP, was distrusted 
by large sections of their community. In Gujarat, in the door-to-door campaigning by family 
members in Dalit neighbourhoods in the final days of electioneering, it was such works that 
were highlighted. In Bhagalpur, Shahnawaz Husain asked Muslim voters to vote for him: 
I have come here - not to ask [you to] give votes in the name of Islam, caste, 
religion, kinship – I have come to say even if I was not from the minority 
community…and solved your problems…would you give me a reward or not? 
[audience shouts back saying we would] … 
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References to the work that the candidate had done for the community can be seen as appealing 
to the values of reciprocity of patron-client relationships - votes as the pay-back due to 
representatives for the goods rendered to constituents belonging to their community. The 
language used for mobilizing reciprocity was not, however, that of hierarchy or kinship 
relations characteristic of patronage, nor of a clientalistic exchange, but of equality and just 
deserts (insaaf), the honourable reward due to the representative for the services he had 
rendered to his constituents, the masters of his electoral fate.  
Thus far I have suggested that representative claims were shape shifting, deploying 
creative discursive strategies of reframing and circumventing their party. The further question 
this raises is to what extent were such claims successful in altering the overall pattern of 
representation? While Saward’s account offers little guidance here, if we take the indicator of 
voter responses as evidenced in the reactions of constituents to claims during election meetings, 
it would appear that representative claims had limited efficacy. Minority voters did appear to 
appreciate the inclusion of minority candidates by major parties, as reflected in the higher 
turnouts in meetings in minority neighbourhoods. However, in interviews and conversations 
later, minority voters seemed unconvinced that BJP representatives could represent Dalit and, 
more substantially, Muslim interests. In Ahmedabad, the passage of Dr Solanki’s convoy 
through a Dalit neighbourhood was interrupted by angry youth demanding to know why their 
living conditions had seen little improvement under the BJP. In Bhagalpur, while Muslim 
voters turned out for Shahnawaz Husain’s speeches and clapped on cue, in interviews 
afterwards, they seemed less convinced of the work he had done in his latest stint as MP, and 
more importantly whether his party could be trusted to protect their interests. In post-election 
interviews, Shahnawaz Husain’s team reckoned that notwithstanding the work that he had done 
for his Muslim constituents, they would not vote for him, on account of their fear of the BJP. 
Whether this in fact transpired, with Muslims in Bhagalpur voting for the Hindu candidate 
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from the BJP’s main rival, thereby contributing to Shahnawaz’ narrow defeat in 2014, is hard 
to establish with the available data. What is clear is that notwithstanding the representatives’ 
creative attempts to appeal directly to their minority constituents over the heads of their party, 
their party affiliation limited the shape-shifting work of representative claims, across the two 
very different cases.  
 
Conclusions and discussion  
Whereas who represents is increasingly accepted as important, what they represent has 
remained under-analysed. This article has argued for bringing together two distinct strands of 
normative debates on group representation and representative claims, for an inductive inquiry 
into what descriptive representatives describe in election campaigns. In conclusion, I will 
highlight some wider implications of my findings of my comparative case study of Indian 
election campaigns for debates on shape-shifting representatives, descriptive representation 
and democratic theory. 
My findings confirm several elements of Saward’s theory of shape-shifting 
representation, while also illuminating some of its problems. Saward is right that shape-shifting 
representation is the norm rather than aberration- in our cases, minority representatives moved 
across multiple positionings constantly, adapting their persona to the audience they were 
addressing. With non-minority audiences, minority representatives often acted as delegates of 
their political party; with minority audiences, by contrast, they often claimed to be trustees of 
community interests. However, my findings also suggest that for guiding evaluations of shape-
shifting and its democratic character, Saward’s current formulation needs development in at 
least the following respects. First, there are multiple perspectives for evaluations of shape-
shifting, as well as multiple dimensions of presence or descriptive likeness, neglected in 
Saward’s account. Claims that were shape-shifting from the vantage point of the representative, 
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yielded to patterns of representation that appeared shape-confined when viewed from the 
standpoint of constituent responses. Furthermore, representative claims moved across different 
dimensions of descriptive likeness, with the same audience and at the same time, without as 
Saward suggests (2014: 731), opening themselves up to charges of inconsistency. Social 
identity is a dynamic site at the intersection of multiple networks rather than a single, 
monochromatic position. Second, as a model for the work of representation, the notion of shape 
shifting appears to overestimate the room for agent choice, and underestimate the structural 
constraints on representative claims. In our cases, Dalit and Muslim representatives did deploy 
shape-shifting discursive strategies, seeking to reframe identities, notably community identity 
with non-minority voters and party identity with minority voters. However, whether the overall 
patterns of representation were shape-shifting is arguable, given the influence of available 
vocabularies and dominant understandings among their constituents. Third, Saward’s criteria 
for evaluation for both the extent of shape-shifting and its democratic character, need 
specification. Thus, although his examples focus almost exclusively on claim-making, deeming 
a pattern of representation shape-shifting for Saward entails some engagement with the 
reception of representative claims, of their persuasiveness for audiences and constituents 
(2014: 732). Similarly, democratic legitimacy for Saward depends on the acceptance of 
representative claims by the relevant constituency. However, what counts as persuasiveness or 
acceptance by a constituency, remains unclear. Does majority or plurality assent suffice for 
instance, or are deliberative debate and reflection necessary? A deliberative ideal informs 
Saward’s assessments of democratic legitimacy, as successful shape-shifting is not democratic 
when it obscures and blurs ‘the basis upon which constituencies may accept or reject 
representative claims’ (2014: 734). But how deliberative legitimacy is to be established with 
respect to his criteria of plurality, equal access, variability and reflexivity, also given that voter 
choices are re-shaped by representative claims, remains unclear.  
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My findings also challenge key assumptions of theories of descriptive representation. 
In arguments for group representation, the perspectives that descriptive representatives 
describe are assumed to be derived from their minority identities, typically characterized in 
terms of difference from the majority. By contrast, in our cases, minority representatives chose 
to define themselves overwhelmingly in terms of similarity with the majority, invoking party 
and regional identities that they shared in common with majority voters. There was little, if any 
articulation of cultural difference from the majority during electioneering. The focus on 
similarity rather than difference could be the result of multiple factors, including for instance, 
the requirements of winning electoral contests in a demographic context where minority 
representatives depend on the support of non-minority voters, pressures on minorities to 
conform to dominant norms, and/or a desire on the part of minority representatives to not to be 
pigeon-holed within the confines of a single ascribed identity. Whatever the reason, our 
findings suggest that representatives from minority backgrounds may have an incentive to use 
rhetoric that appeals to the sentiments and prejudices of the majority, to counter their identity-
deficit as marginal or outsiders in a polity. Second, the assumption that shared group 
membership automatically makes for greater trust between representatives and their co-ethnics 
is not supported by this study. In the case of our representatives, identification and trust with 
their communities, nominally Dalit and Muslim, was not given but rather required identity-
work across the barriers of class and sub-group that separated representatives from most of 
their co-ethnics. Most significantly, their party affiliation posed a barrier to the trust that is 
presumed to exist on account of a shared social identity between minority representatives and 
minority voters. Furthermore, attempts at reframing their party by representatives did not 
appear to overcome distrust of their party membership from their co-ethnics.  
Whereas a minority position is often defined in singular terms, as inhabited by a 
marginalized group defined interchangeably by race (Blacks) or religion (Muslims) for 
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instance (see eg. Young 2000: 123, and for a contrast, Phillips 1995:4), my findings suggest 
that the constraints within which representatives made choices differed across different 
minority groups. Caste and religious minorities were differently disadvantaged by majoritarian 
Hindu nationalism. In the BJP’s Hindu nationalist ideology, Dalits are incorporated through 
hegemonic inclusion within upper-caste norms, whereas Muslims are excluded as foreign 
invaders. A Dalit MP could choose not to self-identify as a Dalit during campaigning, whereas 
a Muslim MP did not have that choice, his religious identity hyper-visible in his name, even 
when he adopted no religious markers. Recent experience across the world suggests that 
majoritarian nationalisms can strategically include some marginalized groups (eg. women), to 
legitimate the exclusion of other minorities (eg Muslims), keeping existing power hierarchies 
intact. In India, Hindu nationalism’s quest for the domination of Muslims has been advanced 
by its partial accommodation of some Dalit and tribal groups, as well as smaller religious 
minorities such as Parsis (see Buck 2018) and Jains.  
These findings complicate, although they do not negate, the case for a politics of 
presence. If what descriptive representatives describe, and were seen to describe across very 
different cases, was primarily their party identity, then descriptive representation may not allow 
for the substantive representation of minority interests, or the extent to which this occurs is 
constrained by institutional norms, including party ideology. This is not to deny that the 
descriptive representation of marginalized groups is desirable for deepening democracy and 
advancing social justice. Blunt instruments to tackle the entrenched nature of group 
disadvantage can be better than none at all, even if these fail to do justice to the nuances of 
identity. It is, however, to suggest that the case for minority representation needs to go beyond 
the binary between the politics of presence and of ideas, and be attentive to the multiple forms 
in which minority perspectives are articulated through, and constrained by, the politics of ideas 
associated with party competition. More specifically, the presence or inclusion of minority 
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candidates does not necessarily result in voice, let alone influence, and may result in cooptation 
(see also Dovi 2002), even if creativity occurs in its interstices. It may be contended that this 
conclusion derives from the choice of cases, of minority representatives from the majoritarian 
BJP in mixed electorate constituencies. Descriptive representation may offer better substantive 
representation to minorities when linked to minority-centred parties and/or constituencies 
where minorities form a majority of the electorate. Nevertheless, the general point regarding 
the constraints on descriptive representation remains, and is borne out by institutional studies 
in other contexts which show that the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in Parliament 
often results in an adaptation to dominant norms rather than the articulation of diversity (Celis 
and Wauters 2010: 387), from a range of motivations including re-election, reselection, career 
ambition among representatives. My study suggests that in election campaigns, there are strong 
incentives for minority MPs to comply with dominant norms that reflect the values of 
numerically preponderant groups which deny recognition to difference; furthermore, the party 
and its ideology may play a central role in conformity to dominant norms. This in turn poses a 
challenge to assumptions regarding the autonomy of representatives that motivate arguments 
for descriptive representation (Phillips 1995). 
While the importance of political parties is increasingly recognized by normative 
theorists, my findings suggest that this remains inadequately addressed. In particular, theorists 
have tended to underestimate, and/or mischaracterise, the role of political parties in mediating 
the relationship between representatives and constituents. Notably, emerging democratic 
theory has emphasized the role of parties as agents of deliberation (eg. White and Ypi 2011, 
Ebeling 2016); however, my findings suggest that the space for deliberation may be very 
limited in representative practices, and the role of political parties may be less that of enabling, 
than of limiting deliberation. Deliberative theorists argue for partisan fora as ‘effective vehicles 
of civic education and empowerment’ (White and Ypi 2011: 387), however, our cases suggest 
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that these can serve equally as vehicles for ethnic education, mobilizing particularist and 
majoritarian rather than universalist and inclusive notions of the common good (see also van 
Biezen and Saward 2008:31). Against my contention regarding the deliberation-constraining 
role of parties, it can be argued that these findings stem from a focus on India, where party 
control over candidates is strong in relation to selection, voting in legislatures (an anti-defection 
law disqualifies representatives from voting against their party), policy formulation, and 
ideological direction. However, other studies suggest that India illustrates in an accentuated 
form, the ways in which parties limit the freedom and influence of representatives in 
Westminster style parliamentary systems (Bird 2015), constraining deliberation more generally 
(Bhatia 2018).  
In terms of method, I have argued that road-testing normative theories through 
ethnographic inquiry is productive for identifying areas for the development of democratic 
theory. The preoccupation among normative theorists with advancing universal arguments at 
high levels of abstraction has meant that when empirical engagement is sought, it has been 
accompanied by reification and idealization of the real, thereby, paradoxically, further 
distancing political theories from the practices that they seek to improve. Statistical analyses 
of large-n data that focus on aggregate outcomes such as voting and numbers of minority 
representatives in legislatures, remain important for a reckoning of the inclusiveness of 
institutions, but also tend to reify and ascribe categories, viewing minority representatives 
through the lens of a single, given, identity. By contrast, ethnographic inquiry at the micro level 
that focusses on how minority representatives articulate and negotiate the meanings of 
identities better illuminates their multi-layered and dynamic character, as well as lacuna in 
normative theories of descriptive representation and representative claims. While scholars have 
recently highlighted how ethnography can advance normative theory (Herzog and Zacka 2017), 
my case here speaks to a broader role for political theory in political science that includes 
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interpretive and critical purposes as well as normative, that I defend elsewhere (Ackerly and 
Bajpai 2017). By providing a richer and fuller account of the contexts in which claims acquire 
meaning and resonance, as well as of how representatives and parties function and the range 
of roles that they perform, ethnographic studies can contribute to the construction of mid-level 
theory that is necessary if democratic theories are to be more than exercises in deliberative 
escapism and inform improvements in practice. Normative theorists need to learn from 
ethnographic approaches to engage substantively with the exclusionary effects of 
representative practices, and to specify the conditions under which representation may, and 
may not be, democratic. Representative claims offer a promising terrain to develop grounded 
political theory that addresses the real-world challenges that democratic representation 
confronts in our times.  
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1 During April-May 2014, I conducted approximately 200 interviews with the candidates, party 
workers and voters associated with the major parties with the help of two research assistants. 
The campaigns of incumbent representatives, and their principal rivals were trailed across 
multiple sites in different wards of Ahmedabad and Bhagalpur.  
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2 Under India’s reservations system, 84 seats in the Lower House (Lok Sabha) are reserved for 
Scheduled Castes (Dalits) and 47 for Scheduled Tribes (Adivasis). In reserved constituencies, 
all candidates must belong the designated group (Dalit or Adivasi), while the electorate is 
mixed. Scheduled Castes voters are not a majority in most reserved constituencies, unlike the 
more territorially concentrated Scheduled Tribes. During constitution-making, reserved seats 
for Muslims were abolished.  
3 Ideologically, Hindu nationalism seeks to unify all castes under a common religious identity 
and as such offers inclusion to lower castes in theory.  Sociologically, while the core personnel 
and support base of the BJP have been overwhelmingly upper caste, in recent years it has 
expanded its reach among Dalits, other backward castes, and tribal groups.  Modi’s lower caste 
origins are advertised by the BJP as an example of its commitment to social mobility, and 
contrasted with dynastic politics of the Congress party, its main opponent.  
4 Although constraints of space prevent a fuller consideration of the evidence, the centrality of 
the party and its ideology was not limited to the BJP. The representative claims of the Dalit 
Congress candidate from Ahmedabad (West) for instance, invoked the party ideology of 
secularism in the sense of equal respect for minority religions, through practices such as visits 
to churches.  
 
